Hostile Reconnaissance at Jewish Schools: What Recent UK Court Cases Tell School Security Teams

Two of the most serious UK terrorism cases of 2026 have one detail in common that should sit at the top of every school security plan: both involved alleged reconnaissance of a Jewish school before any attempt at violence. In February, Preston Crown Court handed life sentences to the two main defendants in a foiled plot to attack the Jewish community in Greater Manchester. In March, two men were charged under the National Security Act 2023 over alleged surveillance of London targets that reportedly included a Jewish school.

For school security teams, this is the pattern worth studying. Hostile reconnaissance is the stage at which an attack is most visible and most stoppable. By the time a perpetrator returns with the means to act, the window has usually closed. The cases now in front of UK courts give security and pastoral teams an unusually concrete picture of what to watch for.

The Manchester case: what the court heard

On 13 February 2026, Walid Saadaoui, 38, and Amar Hussein, 52, were sentenced at Preston Crown Court to life imprisonment, with minimum terms of 37 and 26 years respectively, after being convicted of preparing acts of terrorism. Walid Saadaoui’s brother, Bilel Saadaoui, 36, received a six-year sentence for failing to disclose information about the plot.

According to the Crown Prosecution Service and Counter Terrorism Policing North West, Walid Saadaoui carried out reconnaissance of targets in north Manchester, including in areas with a significant Jewish population. The plot, prosecutors said, was inspired by Islamic State and aimed at causing mass casualties. The investigation involved undercover officers and culminated in his arrest in May 2024 as he allegedly attempted to take possession of firearms and ammunition.

Two points stand out for school security planners. First, the reconnaissance was reportedly conducted on foot in normal daylight conditions, not in covert circumstances that only a trained surveillance team could detect. Second, the targets were chosen by community profile, not by perimeter weakness. A school does not need to look “vulnerable” to be selected.

The London case: an alleged state-linked surveillance operation

In March 2026, Nematollah Shahsavani, 40, a dual Iranian-British national, and Alireza Farasati, 22, an Iranian national, were charged under section 3 of the National Security Act 2023 with engaging in conduct likely to assist a foreign intelligence service. The Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command alleges the conduct took place between 9 July and 15 August 2025 and involved gathering information on, and undertaking reconnaissance of, locations including synagogues, the Israeli embassy and a Jewish school.

Both defendants deny the allegations and the case is yet to be tried. We make no comment on guilt. What is significant for security teams is the disclosed pattern: alleged reconnaissance carried out on behalf of a foreign state, with a school named alongside diplomatic and faith targets. The threat picture for some sites is now broader than the lone-actor model many risk assessments still assume.

Behavioural indicators worth training staff on

Counter Terrorism Policing’s ACT and ProtectUK guidance, together with detail emerging from recent cases, point to a consistent set of pre-attack behaviours. None is conclusive on its own. The discipline is in noticing, recording, and reporting them as a pattern.

• Loitering near the school perimeter at arrival or dismissal times, particularly with a phone held in a filming or photographing posture.
• Repeated drive-bys at consistent times of day, sometimes in different vehicles.
• Questions to staff or parents about timings, routes, security arrangements, or named individuals, framed as innocent enquiry.
• Attempts to test access controls: trying gates, tailgating through vehicle entrances, or asking to “drop something off” without a verified reason.
• Photography or note-taking focused on entry and exit points, CCTV positions, and points where children gather.
• Use of drones near or above the site without an obvious commercial reason. Counter-UAS reporting has grown sharply in 2026.

The behavioural indicator that matters most is repetition. A single observation may be entirely innocent. The same person, vehicle, or pattern appearing twice or more is the signal that warrants a report.

What this means for UK schools

Reporting infrastructure has improved meaningfully over the past year. Suspicious activity can be reported confidentially via the gov.uk Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321, online at gov.uk/ACT, and through the Community Security Trust on 0800 032 3263 for Jewish community sites. We recommend three operational steps for every UK school, faith-affiliated or otherwise.

• Brief all staff, including reception, caretaking and catering, on hostile-reconnaissance indicators at least once a term. The first person to notice is rarely a security officer.
• Maintain a simple incident log at reception. Date, time, description, and a CCTV reference are enough. Patterns only emerge from records.
• Carry out an annual perimeter walk with a third party, viewing the site from a potential reconnaissance position outside the gates rather than from inside the building. Lines of sight, predictable timings, and unattended access points are the things to fix.

For schools applying for protective security funding, the Jewish Community Protective Security Grant and the Protective Security for Mosques Scheme remain open in the 2026/27 cycle, and the recently expanded Places of Worship Protective Security Funding may apply to faith-affiliated school sites. Eligibility detail is published on gov.uk.

Need a security review?

Our team works with independent and faith-affiliated schools across London and the UK on perimeter assessments, staff training on hostile-reconnaissance indicators, and SIA-licensed school security officers for arrival, dismissal and event cover. A short site visit is usually enough to identify the practical changes that close down a reconnaissance window.

To arrange a confidential review, call us on 020 3700 0967, email info@secureonsitesecurity.co.uk, or use our contact page. You can read more about our school security services, or about the broader pattern of recent UK incidents in our notes on site security planning.